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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have mythologized the United States as a nation of im-
migrants.' Nonetheless, waves of nativism 2 have periodically washed over
the American ethos.' The fundamental tension between these two philos-
ophies has given our nation a sense of irony even in immigration's hey-
day, the turn of the 20th century. At that time, Emma Lazarus' famous
poem, "The New Colossus," celebrated the arrival of the world's
"tired," "poor," and "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" to
America's shores. 4 Ironically, at the same time, the United States was en-
forcing laws that excluded any alien who was likely to become a public
charge.5 In reality, the world's "homeless" and "tempest-tost ' 6 were not
at all welcomed in the United States.
This irony is mirrored in contemporary case law and statutes. Re-
cently, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 became law.7 IIRIRA permits states to classify persons according
to immigration status in ways that previous legislation had not expressly
permitted. Section 553 of the Act authorizes states to prohibit or to limit
1. Thomas J. Espanshade & Katherine Hempstead, Contemporary American Atti-
tudes Toward U.S. Immigration, 30 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 535 (1996), available in 1996
WL 13348001 [hereinafter Espanshade & Hempstead].
2. "Nativism" is a sociopolitical policy, especially in the United States in the 19th
century, favoring the interests of native inhabitants over those of immigrants. AmERICAN
HERrTAGE DICTIONARY 832 (2d College ed. 1985).
3. See Espanshade & Hempstead, supra note 1.
4. See Lazarus supra note *.
5. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
6. See Lazarus supra note *. The full text of the passage is as follows:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tost to me.
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
(emphasis added).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter I1RIRA].
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public benefits available to immigrants.' A state may make such limita-
tions or prohibitions on immigrants, so long as the restrictive classifica-
tions are not more restrictive than limitations imposed under comparable
federal programs. 9
Section 553 says that "a State or a political subdivision of a State is
authorized to prohibit or otherwise limit or restrict the eligibility of aliens
or classes of aliens for programs of general cash public assistance fur-
nished under the law of the State or political subdivision of a State." For
example, a state may impose a restriction, such as a residency or age re-
quirement, that it does not impose upon United States citizens. By the
use of the words "prohibit," "limit," and "restrict," the new law only
authorizes states to be less generous than the federal government in allo-
cating public benefits to immigrants. A state may not expand the availa-
bility of public benefits to aliens where comparable federal programs
make such benefits unavailable.
This article predicts that section 553 of the new law is invalid as it
affects legal immigrants because section 553 permits a state to make dis-
tinctions between immigrants and citizens where it has no legitimate in-
terest to do so. Legal immigrants, having been lawfully admitted to the
United States, have a mixed political status. That is to say, legal immi-
grants share some aspects of the political identity of American citizens.
Yet because legal immigrants do not possess full citizenship, they remain
somewhat distinct from the rest of the body politic. The federal govern-
ment alone possesses a legitimate interest in distinguishing between im-
migrants and citizens because the federal government has the inherent
power of self-definition. This power stems from the federal government's
sovereign power as expressed in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.'0 Individual states do not have a legitimate interest in distin-
guishing between immigrants and citizens because the states do not pos-
sess the full panoply of sovereign powers.
This article proposes some factors which motivated section 553 of
IRIRA and explores the evolution of the section 553 in four parts:
(1) discussion of the events leading up to the Immigration Act's passage,
(2) exposition of the two divergent theories of the immigration power,
(3) summation of relevant case law, and (4) comparison of these criteria
to the language of section 553.
8. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1624 (West Supp. 1997) (codifying section 553 of ITRIRA). See
infra notes 164 and 166 quoting subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of section 553 of
the Act.
9. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1624(b) (West Supp. 1997). See infra note 166 for the full text of
this section.
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE IMMIGRATION ACT'S PASSAGE: CUT-
BACKS IN FEDERAL WELFARE & PROPOSITON 187's FAILURE
IN CALIFORNIA
IIRIRA is the result of current trends to limit both immigration and
public benefits. The saga of California's Proposition 187 and the reform
of federal welfare by the 104th Congress have set the stage for section
553 of IIRIRA.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996"I marked significant cut-backs in the federal welfare pro-
gram. Title IV of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 gives states the option
to bar current and future legal immigrants from receiving Medicaid, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children, Title XX assistance and all means-
tested programs funded by the state. 12 Despite his public criticism of the
bill, President Clinton signed it into law in the final days of the 104th
Congress."
The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 is similar to IRIRA in that both
laws grant to state governments the authority to affect immigration indi-
rectly by treating citizens differently than immigrants in the administra-
tion of public benefits programs.' 4 As is the nature of immigration, both
recent acts touch upon many fields: the balance of power between state
and federal governments, 5 the balance of power among branches of the
federal government, 6 the public persona projected by political leaders 7
11. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) [hereinafter Welfare Reform Act of
1996].
12. 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1029, 1030-31 (Aug. 5, 1996).
13. Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill Amid Division, WASH. POST, Aug.
23, 1996, at Al.
14. See supra notes 7, 11.
15. California voters passed Proposition 187 in 1994. Proposition 187 mirrors the
federal law in that both aim to take away from undocumented persons public benefits
such as education and medical care. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wil-
son, a federal district court struck down substantial parts of Proposition 187 as unconsti-
tutional on the grounds that a state actor cannot regulate immigration. 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995). Governor Pete Wilson of California has favored a policy that limits the
public resources available to immigrants in an attempt to stem the flow of immigration to
that state. See Tim Golden, California Governor Cuts Off Aid for Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 28, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Golden]. Following passage of the Welfare
Reform Act, Wilson signed an executive order on August 27, 1996, announcing that un-
documented aliens will no longer have access to state benefits and services. Id. The order
purports to accomplish the same goals as Proposition 187, only this time Wilson asserts
that he and his constituents have the federal "go ahead." 37 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1187
(Sept. 9, 1996).
16. The IIRIRA attempts to legislate the standard of review to be used by the
courts. See H.R. REP. No. 828, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1996). For discussion on recent
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and the image of America as a nation of immigrants.' To appreciate the
vision of section 553, a recounting of the events leading up to the law's
passage is in order.
In 1994, California voters passed Proposition 187, a measure which
denied many immigrants access to public benefits under state authority. 19
Proposition 187 was intended to dissuade undocumented immigrants from
coming to California, but the proposition died when a federal district
court found that it intruded upon Congressional power over immigra-
tion.20 Drafters of Proposition 187 considered curtailing availability of
public benefits to immigrants as a legitimate means to dissuade migration
to the State.2t In addition, California Governor Pete Wilson had been a
proponent of the proposition and has remained resolute on his stance to
dissuade migration to the State.
22
Forces driving immigration can be either "push" or "pull" factors. 23
For example, civil unrest or poverty in a foreign country will "push"
people to emigrate from their native land. The availability of jobs or
public benefits in another country will "pull" immigrants to a host coun-
try.24 The drafters of Proposition 187 considered the availability of public
benefits in the State to be a "pull" factor, which they hoped Proposition
187 would eliminate.35 However, a federal district court ruled that signifi-
cant portions of Proposition 187 were preempted by the federal power
case law concerning whether legislative measures might violate the separation of powers,
see infra note 168.
17. As part of his 1992 campaign, President Clinton promised to "end welfare as
we know it." President's Address to the Nation on the Economic Program, 2 Pub. Papers,
1321, 1324 (Aug. 3, 1993). He may have felt compelled to sign the Welfare Reform Act
despite its rider concerning immigrants. Section 412 of the Act grants states the authority
to limit the eligibility of qualified aliens for state benefits and services. Act of Aug. 22,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 2105) 2269.
18. See Espanshade & Hempstead, supra note 1, at 536.
19. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763
(C.D. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter LULAC].
20. Id. at 775.
21. Id. at 765.
22. See Golden, supra note 15, at Al.
23. Alejandro Portes & J6zsef Birocz, Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Per-
spectives on its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation, 23 INr'L MIGRATION REV. 606.
607-14 (1989), reprinted in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 70-74 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Portes & Borcz].
24. Portes & Bor6cz, supra note 23.
25. LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 765 (stating that "[tihe benefits denial provisions ...
have the purpose of deterring illegal aliens from entering or remaining in the United
States.").
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over immigration. 26 In particular, the district court found that the provi-
sions which required state officials to report, notify and enforce federal
laws penalizing illegal immigrants were beyond the competency of the
state government. 27
In enacting IIRIRA, the federal legislature has attempted to resurrect
the spirit of Proposition 187. The practical effect of section 553 of the
LIRIRA is to permit some of the same results that Proposition 187 would
have allowed.28 Proposition 187 announced California's intention to pre-
vent illegal immigrants from receiving public social services, publicly-
funded health care, and public education. Section 553 of the federal law
permits states to prohibit, limit or restrict immigrant access to the same
benefits, by allowing the state to classify according to immigration status.
In addition, section 553 of the federal law expands the scope of Proposi-
tion 187. Proposition 187 was targeted only to illegal immigrants; section
553 permits California to pass laws affecting both illegal and legal immi-
grants.29 IIRIRA takes its cue from Proposition 187, but moves beyond it
by permitting state governments to impose limits on all immigrants, re-
gardless of their legal status.
Congress enacted the 1996 law on the heels of the defeat of Pro-
position 187. This sequence of events indicates that Congress intends to
permit states to effect those restrictions envisioned by mandates such as
Proposition 187, by eliminating "pull" factors at the local level and
making access to public benefits substantially more restrictive. 30 Congress
has followed the will of a state to limit both immigration and public ben-
efits. In no other area of the law would this seem to be an unusual chain
of events. In the field of immigration, however, there are questions as to
the legitimacy of the federal government following a state's lead.
26. Id. at 778-79.
27. Id. at 770.
28. Section 553 of the IIRIRA purportedly grants to states a discretionary function
in determining which applicants for public benefits are eligible. See infra notes 164, 166.
In LULAC, Judge Pfaelzer rejected a parallel provision in Proposition 187, stating that
"[p]ermitting state agents, who are untrained - and unauthorized - under federal law to
make immigration status decisions, incurs the risk that inconsistent and inaccurate judg-
ments will be made." LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 770.
29. Section 553 of the IIRIRA refers to "aliens or classes of aliens" generally; no
distinction is made between legal and illegal aliens. See infra note 164.
30. LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 765 (stating that the purpose of Proposition 187 was to
"deter illegal aliens from entering and remaining in the United States .... "); 73 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1187 (Sept. 9, 1996) (quoting Pete Wilson's characterization of public
benefits as a "magic lure" to immigrants).
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III. Two DIVERGENT THEORIES OF THE IMMIGRATION POWER:
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMMITTED POWER OR INHERENTLY
SOVEREIGN POWER
Two theories account for the immigration power: constitutionally
committed power and inherently sovereign power. To assess the alleged
validity of section 553, we must consider each of these two theories. The
two theories are opposites, and the ramifications of each theory diverge
from the other, as the waters of a forked river diverge. Even when a
court denies that it has authority to review an immigration law, it does so
after having decided, sometimes implicitly, that one of the two theories is
correct. When a court reviews an immigration law, its choice of which
theory to use shapes the opinion almost entirely.
First, the court's use of the constitutionally committed theory results
in judicial review of a law's merits and subjects the challenged law to
constitutional jurisprudence on equal protection and individual liberties.3'
Second, the court's use of the inherently sovereign power theory results
in minimal judicial review that does not reach the merits and does not
subject the challenged law to constitutional jurisprudence of equal protec-
tion and individual rights.32
A. Constitutionally Committed Power
Although the term "constitutionally committed" is used to describe
the power, the term describes an analogy for how the power operates.
The immigration power is not enumerated in the Constitution. Powers
enumerated in the Constitution have been called "delegated" powers.
Since the immigration power is not expressly enumerated, it may be
called a "delegatable" power, in order to distinguish it from those pow-
ers explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. As a "delegatable" power,
the immigration power sometimes permits the states to exercise authority
concurrently with the federal government.
Where the immigration power is treated as constitutionally commit-
ted, the federal government may delegate its power to the states and
thereby permit the state to legislate on some aspects of immigration. Be-
cause of its mode of operation, the power over immigration is analogous
31. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (scrutinizing state action, using the constitutional jurisprudence devel-
oped under tie Equal Protection Clause).
32. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding that federal statutes are
subject only to a showing that the immigration classification used is not wholly
irrational).
1997]
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to the power over interstate commerce. 33 The commerce power analogy
results in constitutional constraints and judicial review being placed upon
immigration laws. Traditionally, the power to regulate immigration has
been within the exclusive domain of the federal government. 34 Traditional
constitutional jurisprudence includes review under the Fifth35 and Four-
teenth Amendments and case law development under these
amendments. 36
When the court considers state laws, equal protection applies be-
cause of the interpretation of the word "person" in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 37 Judicial opinions likening the federal power over immigra-
tion to the power over interstate commerce generally concern state laws
which either directly or indirectly affect immigration. Courts have applied
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis to such cases.38 The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been inter-
preted to include aliens in the definition of "person." 3 9 The inclusive in-
terpretation of the word "person" is consistent with the view that
America is a nation of immigrants.
In light of the similarities between the immigration power under this
theory and other constitutionally committed powers, some scholars have
urged that congressional mandates, like the exercise of any enumerated
power, are subject to heightened judicial review.'" Nonetheless, the fact
that the immigration power is not specifically enumerated remains the
greatest weakness to this argument. The power over immigration is a sig-
33. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (hold--
ing that state laws "conflicting with the constitutionally derived federal power to regulate
immigration [are] invalid.") (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
35. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
36. For example, equal protection of the laws is not stated explicitly in the Fifth
Amendment. However, case law has recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (en banc) ("[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The equal protection of
the laws is a more explicit safe guard of prohibited unfairness then due process of law
.... ") (emphasis in original). Therefore, in an analysis of an immigration issue that as-
sumes that the immigration power is a constitutionally committed power, constitutional
jurisprudence must be taken into account.
37. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (citations omitted).
40. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Con-
gressional Power, 1985 SUp. CT. REV. 255.
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nificant political power, capable of defining the identity of a nation and
necessary for a nation's political survival. The inherently sovereign
power theory provides an alternative rationale for the exercise of immi-
gration authority.
B. Inherently Sovereign Power
The inherently sovereign power theory states that the power to con-
trol the flow of people over a nation's borders is inherent in sovereignty.
The Supreme Court outlined the boundaries of this theory:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners in its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as
it may see fit to prescribe. 4'
The inherently sovereign power over immigration is a power shared
by all autonomous nations. All nations possess the power to control their
borders, regardless of whether there are limitations placed upon their au-
thority, as stated in a constitution or other articles. The power over immi-
gration, as expressed through the inherently sovereign power theory, is
therefore extra-constitutional.
There are other incidents of sovereignty apart from the power over
immigration. The power to conduct foreign affairs also attaches to the
sovereign power.42 The Supreme Court announced the relationship be-
tween sovereign power and the power to conduct foreign relations as
follows:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America. . . .The Union existed before the Constitution, which
was ordained and established among others things to form "a
more perfect Union. . . .It results that the investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.43
41. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (emphasis added).
42. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936).
43. Id.
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Curtiss-Wright, from which the above quote is taken, involved the
source of the foreign policy power, which the Court held to be an inci-
dent of sovereignty. The Court later held that the power to conduct for-
eign affairs is analogous to the immigration power." Under the inherently
sovereign power theory, the immigration power has an extra-
constitutional source. Since the source of the immigration power is be-
yond the powers enumerated in the Constitution, constitutional jurispru-
dence has no place in the Court's consideration of the immigration laws.
Furthermore, the Court has used the inherently sovereign power theory to
limit the scope of judicial review on the substance of federal immigration
statutes. 45 Consequently, the inherently sovereign power theory produces
few, if any, constraints on the exercise of federal power over immigra-
tion, and cannot be delegated from the federal sovereign to dependent
political entities, such as the states. To delegate a sovereign power is to
tear it from its source.
The two theories are polar opposites, representing alternative justifi-
cations for the exercise of the immigration power. Nonetheless, both the-
ories are apposite in analyzing IIRIRA section 553. The analysis begins
with three important Supreme Court decisions: Graham v. Richardson,
DeCanas v. Bica, and Mathews v. Diaz. First, in 1971 the Supreme Court
considered Graham v. Richardson,' in which the Court held that state
laws affecting immigrants were void. Second, in DeCanas v. Bica,47 the
Court upheld a state law which made it a crime to knowingly employ an
illegal immigrant. Third, in Mathews v. Diaz,48 the Court stated that the
federal government can treat legal and illegal immigrants differently than
citizens in federal public benefits programs.
, IV. CASE LAW ON IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC BENEFITS
A. State Public Benefits Must Be Made Available to Immigrants Under
Constitutionally Committed Theory: Graham v. Richardson
The Supreme Court held in 1971 that a state law is invalid if it
places restrictions on immigrants that the state government does not
44. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
45. See, e.g., Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that when
"the Executive exercises [its] power . . . on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona
fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it
by balancing its justification against [other] interests.
46. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
48. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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place on citizens.49 In addition, the Court also held that a state law is in-
valid if it places restrictions on immigrants that the federal government
does not place on immigrants.50 The plaintiffs in Graham v. Richardson
challenged states laws in Arizona and Pennsylvania on equal protection
grounds." The Arizona statute granted disability benefits, funded in part
by the federal government, to citizens and to immigrants who had resided
in the state for fifteen or more years.5 2 The Pennsylvania statute granted
disability benefits, funded entirely by the state, to citizens only. 3 Rich-
ardson held that the states' statutes were void on two grounds.5 4 First, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a state to impose different re-
quirements on aliens than on citizens, because both are "persons" under
the Equal Protection Clause.5 5 Second, the federal plenary power doctrine
does not permit the state to make laws that are in conflict with congres-
sional regulation of immigration.5 6
The first ground for the Richardson opinion is the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion
of the Court, based the equal protection analysis upon the long-held rule
that the term "person" in the 14th Amendment includes aliens as well as
citizens.5 7 The Court in Richardson borrows from its earlier decision in
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission. In Takahashi, the Court held
that a state could not prohibit aliens from harvesting fish from its waters
where it allowed U.S. citizens to do so." Applying traditional constitu-
tional analysis, the Court held that the state law in Takahashi was void
for impeding a person's right to make a living.59
Several consequences follow from the Court's interpretation of "per-
son" in the 14th Amendment to include aliens. First, Blackmun states
that the Court shall review state actions that classify people according to
49. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 366.
52. Id. at 367.
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id. at 376.
55. Id. at 375. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
use of the word "person" in this amendment has been interpreted to include non-citizen
aliens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
56. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 378.
57. Id. at 371 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948)).
58. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 412, 420.
59. 14. at 420.
1997]
236 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
their immigration status with "close judicial scrutiny. ' 6" The Blackmun
opinion states that this is the appropriate standard of review because
aliens are a "discrete and insular minority."' 61 Furthermore, in order to
pass "close judicial scrutiny," the state must put forth a compelling rea-
son that justifies classifying according to immigration status.62 Second,
the Blackmun opinion is notable for what it does not decide. The Court
does not decide whether a fundamental right is at stake.63 Instead, by rul-
ing that the state has the onus of putting forth a compelling reason, the
Court applies strict scrutiny without deciding whether the right to access
public benefits is fundamental. 64 The Court also does not decide if the
special public interest doctrine should be overruled.65 By holding that an
immigrant is a "person" in the view of the 14th Amendment, the Court
prevents the state from claiming that welfare benefits are a special public
interest, also called a "privilege" in prior case law. 66 Therefore, the state
does not possess absolute authority in granting benefits, but must condi-
tion its exercise of power upon constitutional norms.
67
The second ground for the Richardson decision rests upon the fed-
eral plenary power doctrine which does not permit the state to make laws
that are in conflict with congressional regulation of immigration. 68 Justice
Blackmun again borrows from the Court's earlier decision in Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Commission. Takahashi held that a state can neither add,
nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admis-
sion, naturalization and residence. 69 The Court found that the public
60. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)).
62. Id. at 375.
63. Id. at 375-76.
64. Id. at 376.
65. Id. at 374. (The special public benefits doctrine drew a distinction between a
"right" and a "privilege." Under this doctrine, public benefits, among other things, were
characterized as a privilege. Therefore, under this doctrine, the state had broad discretion
to exclude aliens from the privileges of citizenship. Although Takahashi did not explicitly
overrule this doctrine, it substantially weakened it. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE 354-56 (3d ed. 1992)).
66. Id. at 374.
67. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990) (stating that
constitutional jurisprudence created outside the immigration context has been used in the
interpretation of immigration statutes, and thus has eroded the plenary power doctrine).
68. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 378.
69. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (stating that
"[s]tates can neither add nor take away from the conditions lawfully imposed by Con-
gress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the
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charge provision of Immigration and Nationality Act 70 precluded Arizona
and Pennsylvania from passing the public welfare laws at issue in Rich-
ardson.71 The public charge provisions of the INA state that an alien
seeking entry into the United States is excludable if he or she is likely to
become in need of public benefits. 72 When an alien seeks to enter the
United States, the decision about the alien's likelihood to become a pub-
lic charge is limited to the circumstances that exist at the time of the
alien's entry.73 Unforeseen events may occur after the alien's entry which
may cause the alien to seek public benefits. At the time of the Richard-
son opinion, the occurrence of unforeseen events did not retroactively
render the alien excludable because Congress had not shown intent to
consider circumstances arising after the alien's entry. The Arizona and
Pennsylvania statutes placed conditions on the alien after entry and were
thereby preempted by the Congressional enactment. 74
The Blackmun opinion approached the equal protection theory and
the federal-state power theory with the underlying assumption that the
immigration power is constitutionally committed. 75 In addressing the va-
lidity of the state laws, the Court applied the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment.76 In fact, all parties to the suit assumed that the
14th Amendment was applicable; even the defending states argued to the
Court that their laws were in keeping with the equal protection require-
ment.77 The Blackmun opinion assumes that the constitutionally commit-
ted theory underpins the immigration power. Consequences of this pre-
mise are apparent from the Court's action: (1) the Court reviews the
merits of the statutes in question, and (2) the Court applies constitutional
norms in making its review.
several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or resi-
dence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with the constitutionally derived
federal power to regulate immigration and have accordingly be held invalid.").
70. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1645 (Supp. 1997) [hereinafter INA].
71. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 377 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8), 1182(a)(15), and
1251(a)(8) (1970) (substantially similar provisions codified at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(4)
and 1251(a)(5) (Supp. 1997)).
72. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(8) (Supp. 1997).
73. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 377.
74. Id. at 378.
75. Id. (stating that "[s]tate laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare ben-
efits merely because of their alienage conflict with ... overriding national policies in an
area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.") (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
76. Id. at 376.
77. Id. at 370-71.
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The Blackmun opinion follows from the unstated premise that the
immigration power is constitutionally derived. This premise makes possi-
ble the equal protection analysis, where the Court confines state laws us-
ing immigration classifications within constitutional limits. The Blackmun
opinion does not expand its rule to include federal laws using immigra-
tion classifications. The Blackmun opinion does not directly address
whether the federal government may authorize states to classify accord-
ing to immigration status in allotting public benefits.
B. State Criminal Sanctions Affecting Immigration Are Permissible
Under a Three-Part Test: DeCanas v. Bica
In DeCanas v. Bica,71 the Supreme Court held that state action may
affect immigration under a three-part test: the state law is permissible so
long as it does not amount to a "regulation" of immigration, 79 does not
conflict with Congress's purpose to oust state authority,80 and does not
act as an obstacle to the execution of federal laws.8' The DeCanas Court
treats the immigration power under both the constitutionally-committed
and inherently-sovereign theories.
At issue in DeCanas is whether California's authority enables it to
enact laws making an employer criminally liable for knowingly employ-
ing an undocumented alien.82 Laid-off migrant farmers, who were U.S.
citizens, charged their former employers under the California statute,
claiming that the employers had dismissed them because undocumented
workers from Mexico were willing to take jobs for lower wages. 83 In up-
holding the state's criminal sanction, the Court articulated a three-part
test for determining when a state law is in violation of the federal immi-
gration power.
The first prong requires that the state law is void if it amounts to a
"regulation" of immigration.8 4 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan de-
fined the regulation of immigration as the power to "determin[e] who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain."8" Although the Court agreed
that the power to regulate immigration was exclusive to the federal gov-
78. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
79. Id. at 356.
80. Id. at 358.
81. Id. at 363.
82. Id. at 352-53.
83. Id. at 353.
84. Id. at 355.
85. Id.
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eminent, 86 it found that the California law was not a regulation of immi-
gration; the law was a regulation of employment.8 7 The state's law affect-
ing illegal immigration fell outside the Court's definition of "regulation,"
for the state's law did not affect the undocumented workers qua aliens;
the state law affected them qua employees. In short, state laws which do
not amount to a regulation of immigration are permissible. 8
To determine whether a state enactment is a "regulation of immigra-
tion," the Court found that the state's action must be judged against Con-
gressional action.8 9 The Brennan opinion explained that "absent
[C]ongressional action, [a state law] would not be an invalid state incur-
sion on federal power. ' 9° The Court considered whether Congress in-
tended the INA to be the exhaustive doctrine on immigration. 9' If so,
then where Congress is silent, the Court must invalidate any state legisla-
tion in this field.92 The Court stated that its prior jurisprudence has never
held that Congressional power over immigration, whether latent or exer-
cised, pre-empts any state legislation dealing with aliens. 93 Therefore, if
Congress is silent on an issue affecting immigration, the first DeCanas
test permits the state law so long as it does not regulate the alien qua
alien, but according to some other attribute, such as the alien's embloy-
ment status.
94
The second prong requires that the state law is void if Congress has
evinced a "clear and manifest purpose" to oust state authority.95 The
Court derived this test from the Supremacy Clause, which reads as
follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
86. Id. at 354.
87. Id. at 355.
88. Id. (stating that "the Court has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by
this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.")
89. Id. at 356.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 355.
92. Id. at 356 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963)).
93. Id. (stating that "[Tihe Court has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by
this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised."). It is important to note that the
Brennan opinion assumes that the power over immigration is a constitutionally committed
power. See id.
94. Id. at 357.
95. Id.
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shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.96
Using this clause of the Constitution, the Court ruled that a state action
affecting immigration is void if Congress has evinced a clear and mani-
fest purpose to oust state authority. 97 The second DeCanas test is lenient
toward state action that touches upon immigration because Congressional
intent must be "clear and manifest" in order to remove state action from
the field.98 In addition, the Court portrays Congress as the "ouster" of
state authority.99 The term "oust" carries with it the connotation that the
state occupies the field by default, such as when Congress is silent on an
issue. Furthermore, from the language of the rule, the Court appears to
place the onus on Congress of "ousting" state action from the field. 1°
"Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power including
state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws was 'the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress' " would justify the conclusion
that the state law was preempted. 10' The Brennan opinion recognizes that
the state's police power authorizes it to legislate employment relation-
ships.102 The federal government may only thwart this power when some
"persuasive reason" exists. 03
The third prong requires that the state law is void if it acts as an ob-
stacle to the execution of federal laws.'04 The Brennan opinion does not
reach the merits of this test, stating that it is for the state court to con-
strue the California law and to decide whether its construction interferes
with the INA. 105 It is important to note that the theory underpinning the
third DeCanas test is the theory which holds that the immigration power
is inherent in sovereignty. In the sovereign power theory, the immigration
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357.
98. Id. at 360 n.8.
99. Id. at 357.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146
(1963)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations in original).
102. Id. at 356.
103. Id. The Court's rule is very permissive of state regulation of employment. Id. at
357. However, the Court recognizes that the California law is consistent with 1974
amendments to- the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act. Id. at 361.
104. Id. at 363 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
105. Id. at 364-65.
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power is analogous to the power over foreign policy.'0 6 The purpose and
objectives of Congress, like foreign policy, may change when the appro-
priate branch of the federal government responds to changing circum-
stances. The alterable quality of the exercise of the immigration power is
unlike Congressional action under the commerce clause, for the com-
merce power is confined by Constitutional limits. 107 In saying that the
state law is void only if it stands as "an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress," the third
DeCanas test recognizes that the state power may be exercised under a
particular Congressional immigration policy.'08 However, if the Congres-
sional policy changes, the once permissible state law may become void.
In addition, under the third DeCanas test, immigration is the sacrosanct
power of the sovereign and not delegatable to the state in the guise of
the state's police power.1 9
On the other hand, the first two DeCanas tests assume that the im-
migration power is a constitutionally committed power."0 The first two
tests permit states to exercise some authority, so long as it is consistent
with federal mandate. In formulating the first test, the Court refers to the
power over immigration as a "constitutional power," and therefore per-
mits some state action."' Under this test, Congressional silence does not
permit the Court to negate all state laws affecting immigration." 2
Likewise, the Court uses the second DeCanas test to treat the immi-
gration power as a constitutionally committed power.' 3 In the second
test, the Court derives the power over immigration from the Supremacy
Clause." 4 Reading the immigration power in tandem with the Supremacy
Clause indicates that the immigration power functions as a constitution-
ally committed power. Under this test, Congress must clearly demonstrate
that it wishes to "oust" state power in the field." 5 This description as-
sumes that the state authority is logically prior to the federal authority
and indicates that the state retains some residual power over immigration
which fills the voids created by Congressional silence.
106. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67).
109. Id. at 354.
110. Id. at 355-56.
111. Id. at 355.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 356.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 357.
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In conclusion, the DeCanas decision blurs the distinction between
the two theories of the immigration power. The first and second of the
DeCanas tests come from the premise that the immigration power oper-
ates as a constitutionally-committed power. The third test presumes that
the power is inherent in sovereignty. The Brennan opinion attempts to
synthesize two theories which are incapable of uniting. The theory which
views the immigration power as delegatable treats the power as a consti-
tutionally-derived power." 6 The sovereign power theory treats the power
over immigration as extra-constitutional.' ' 7 The immigration power can-
not at once be constitutionally-derived and extra-constitutional. Nonethe-
less, later Court decisions and IIRIRA continue to blend the two theories.
C. Federal Government's Sovereign Power Is Absolute in Allotting
Public Benefits to Immigrants: Mathews v. Diaz
Although there are limits to the state authority in the immigration
context, no such limit exists on federal authority."8 In Mathews v. Diaz,
the Supreme Court considered whether the federal government could treat
lawful permanent residents differently than citizens in the administration
of the federally funded Medicaid Program.' 9 At issue in Diaz were re-
strictions which required the recipients of Medicaid benefits to be 65
years of age or older and which required noncitizens to reside five or
more years in the United States. 20 The federal law, therefore, classified
according to immigration status, placing greater restrictions on legal im-
migrants than on citizens.
Justice Stevens wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court, which
held that the federal government could set any limits that were "not
wholly irrational" on immigranit access to public benefits.' 2' In Diaz,
plaintiff Espinosa brought a due process claim under the Fifth Amend-
ment in federal district court. 22 She was a lawful permanent resident of
116. See supra part II.A.
117. See supra part II.B.
118. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 83.
122. Id. at 74. Only one of the three named plaintiffs in the suit, Espinosa, was a
lawful permanent resident disputing the five year requirement. Id. The other plaintiffs
were not lawful permanent residents. Id. The Court considered Espinosa's claims sepa-
rately because it felt that his claims called into question the federal government's author-
ity in light of Fifth Amendment due process protection. Id. Espinosa's claim questioned
to what extent federal plenary power over immigration was conditioned by the Fifth
Amendment due process clause. Id.
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the United States; she met the age requirement, but, she had not been in
the United States for the required five years.123 The district court granted
the relief she sought, and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 24 The Stevens opinion held that
the federal government may condition a legal immigrant's receipt of fed-
eral medical assistance program upon a five-year residency requirement,
and thereby treat legal immigrants differently than citizens.125
The Stevens opinion blends elements of both theories in the Diaz
opinion, but favors the sovereign power theory. Stevens tried to harmo-
nize the constitutionally committed theory with the sovereign power the-
ory.126 Analysis of the Stevens opinion demonstrates that the Court is at
the crossroads between the two theories underlying the immigration
power. 27 Many aspects of the Diaz opinion indicate that the Court is per-
suaded more by the theory that immigration power is rooted in sover-
eignty. 28 Nonetheless, elements of the opposing theory, which likens the
immigration power to a constitutionally committed power, are commin-
gled in the opinion. 29
Primarily, Justice Stevens justifies the federal government's power to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship by citing to its sovereign
power. 30 In keeping with the sovereign power theory, the Diaz Court
states that the regulation of immigration is a political question.' 3' As pat-
terns of immigration are subject to changing world forces, the federal
government must be unhindered to deal with immigration's fluctuation.
Justice Stevens warns that any constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility of the political branches from responding to changing world
conditions can only be entered into with a great deal of caution. 32
Nontheless, the Diaz Court also treats the immigration power as
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 84-85. The Court claims that the two theories can be harmonized when
in making the distinction between state and federal governments. However, immigration
classifications in public benefits made by a state government are invidious. Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The same classifications made by the federal govern-
ment are not invidious according to the Diaz Court. The stark contrast in outcomes is not
harmonious.
127. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80. Justice Stevens refers to the "naturalization and immigra-
tion power," calling to mind the constitutional provision. Id. Also, Justice Stevens re-
minds us that immigration involves relations with foreign powers. Id. at 81.
128. Id. at 81.
129. Id. at 80.
130. Id. at 81.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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having a constitutional basis.'33 For example, Justice Stevens writes,
"whereas the Constitution inhibits every State's power to restrict travel
across its own borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that
type of control over travel across the borders of the United States."' 13 4
The Diaz Court reasons that the plenary immigration power which per-
mits a sovereign to exclude aliens likewise enables any nation to exclude
aliens from public benefits. 3 5 Therefore, the power to exclude from ben-
efits permits classification on the basis of citizenship. 36 Justice Stevens
links the power to discriminate on basis on citizenship and the power to
exclude in the following:
In the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturali-
zation, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reser-
vation of the power to deport have no permissible counterpart in
the Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its
own citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens dif-
ferently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate
treatment is "invidious". 37
The power to exclude from national shores includes the power to exclude
from other benefits of citizenship. 38 In particular, the sovereign power
justifies the exclusion of lawful permanent residents who have been in
the United States for less than five years from Medicaid benefits. Lawful
permanent residents, unlike citizens, are not full members of the political
community. 39
Furthermore, the unanimous opinion in Diaz mentions the "bounty"
of wealth in the nation and concludes that the United States is permitted
to withhold this bounty with those who do not have full membership in
the body politic. 4'
[T]he fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for
citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens.
Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile
133. Id.
134. Id. at 85.
135. Id. at 82 ("[I]t is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide
all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens. ) (emphasis omitted).
136. Id. at 80.
137. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 82.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 80.
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foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can
advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the
bounty that the conscientious sovereign makes available to its
own citizens and some of its guests.'
4
'
Congress is in the position to decide which of the guests receive benefits,
and the criteria for choosing is almost unbounded, subject only to the re-
quirement that the classification is not "wholly irrational."'' 42 The "not
wholly irrational" standard is an extremely low standard of review, in
keeping with American jurisprudence concerning the federal govern-
ment's power to exclude aliens. 43
As early as 1889, the Court has held that the federal power to ex-
clude immigrants, regardless of the criteria for exclusion, is the ultimate
and only consideration.'" The entering alien has precious few rights in
the eyes of the sovereign, who may select almost arbitrary criteria for ex-
clusion and enforce these criteria with an iron fist. 45 This hard policy
has changed very little since its inception. The Court only limited it in
minor ways, by announcing that admission criteria cannot be completely
arbitrary.'" A federal law regulating the admission of aliens to the United
States may be based on a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason."' 7
Despite the slight softening of the exclusion power, the harsh effects of
the policy remain because the "facially legitimate" requirement is a level
of scrutiny below even the "rational basis" requirement for classifica-
tions arising under constitutional analysis.'" Therefore, despite this ap-
141. Id.
142. Id. at 83.
143. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
144. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
145. Chae Chan Ping is a bald example of the sovereign's ultimate power. The
Court considered a federal exclusion law that had been passed after Chinese immigrants
had been permitted to enter the United States. The law required that the resident aliens
obtain a certificate in order to maintain lawful status. The Chinese immigrants were fur-
ther compelled to have two white witnesses testify on their behalf. The Court held that
this law was a valid exercise of the federal power over immigration. In the Court's view
at the time, the power of the sovereign to maintain the political identity of the state was
paramount. Issues of political identity are alive today, although not presently based on
such arbitrary and racial criteria.
146. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977).
147. Id. at 794.
148. Cf. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (holding
that there was no equal protection violation in disqualifying persons from employment on
the basis of methadone use) Id. at 594. The Court found that there was a rational basis
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parent limitation on exclusion criteria, the federal government maintains
broad discretion to regulate immigration.
The Court distinguishes Diaz from Richardson by virtue of the level
of government making the classifications. 49 "[Richardson] involves sig-
nificantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship be-
tween the alien and the States rather than aliens and the Federal Govern-
ment." 50 The federal government, by virtue of its sovereignty, may
legitimately classify on the basis of citizenship. 151 The individual states
are not entirely sovereign, and therefore cannot put forth citizenship as a
means by which to classify those under its jurisdictions. 52
The Court's opinion in Diaz contains elements of the alternate the-
ory for the immigration power, namely, the constitutional theory.'53 In
discussing possible rationales for classification based on citizenship, the
Diaz Court states that Congress may consider an alien's stake in the
United States. 54 As stated in the introduction, legal immigrants have a
mixed status. They are similar to citizens in that they have entered into
most areas of the body politic. 5 5 Yet, as quasi-members of the political
community, they remain distinct from the citizenry. 56 The more ties the
immigrant has to the United States, the higher stake s/he may claim and
the more like a citizen the immigrant is. 157
Consideration of individual stake makes the Diaz opinion similar to
the focus on individual rights in Richardson. However, under Diaz, the
federal government's plenary power trumps the individual's stake. Justice
Stevens writes, "Congress may decide that as the alien's tie grows
stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that mu-
nificence."'' 5 8 A residency requirement such as five years has a rational
link to the immigrant's stake, for an alien gains stronger ties to the
United States with time. The Court indicates the reasonableness of the
five-year requirement, in saying, "[t]hose who are most like citizens
for the disparate treatment without requiring a close fit between the policy and its pur-
pose. "[I]t is of no constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not as great
with respect to certain ill-defined subparts of the classification as it is with respect to the
classification as a whole." Id. at 593.
149. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976).
150. Id. at 84-85.
151. Id. at 84.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 80.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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qualify. Those who are less like citizens do not."' 15 9
The statement "those who are most like citizens qualify" is the ra-
tional basis for the classification. However, this classification is self-
referential and redundant. Defining who is a citizen and who is "most
like" a citizen is a direct expression of political identity. With the statute
at issue in Diaz, Congress defined those who are "most like citizens" by
setting a five-year residency cut-off. The judiciary uses the sovereign
power theory to side-step having to assess whether what is meant by
"most like citizens" is reasonable in practice. In other words, the sover-
eign power theory permits any conceivable connection that might exist
between the classification and a federal interest to pass muster under the
Fifth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION: SECTION 553 OF IRIRA IS INVALID DUE TO THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE Two THEORIES OF
IMMIGRATION POWER
The two theories of immigration power come from mutually exclu-
sive sources. The sovereign power theory, in its purest form, makes it
impossible for any power over immigration to be delegated to the states.
To delegate a sovereign power is to tear it from its source. As a flower
cut from the vine withers shortly afterward, so does the power of the
sovereign cease to exist when separated from its source. On the other
hand, if the immigration power is constitutionally derived, it is capable
of being delegated. However, under this theory, the immigration power is
constrained by other constitutional powers affecting personal rights. The
Constitution conditions the exercise of governmental power, setting limits
on the ways in which governments may regulate "persons." The three
cases that have shaped this inquiry into the validity of IIRIRA demon-
strate this fundamental conflict between the two theories. The three cases
also demonstrate the present trend toward blending the two theories to-
gether so as to maximize governmental power to the disadvantage of le-
gal immigrants.
Starting from its decision in DeCanas, the Court began to blur the
distinction between the inherently sovereign theory and the constitution-
ally committed theory1 60 The fundamental conflict between the two theo-
ries springs from the fact that the immigration power cannot at once be
constitutionally derived and extra-constitutional. Furthermore, the dishar-
mony between the two theories is shown in the divergent holdings of
Richardson and Diaz. These two opinions offer a striking contrast: both
159. Id. at 83.
160. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
1997]
248 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
cases questioned whether a government actor could condition the receipt
of public benefits upon a residency requirement. The Diaz Court held
that the federal government may use such a residency requirement, and
thereby classify according to immigration status.' 61 The Richardson Court
held that the state government may not classify according to immigration
status, labeling such classifications made by a state actor "invidious."' 162
On the one hand, the sovereign power theory permits the federal govern-
ment to use criteria under a theory even more lenient than rational ba-
sis. 163 On the other hand, the constitutionally committed theory bars the
state from using the same criteria unless under a strict scrutiny analysis.
Title V of URIRA apparently authorizes state governments to restrict
access to public benefits by various classifications of immigrants. In par-
ticular, section 553 establishes that the state or its political subdivisions
may restrict its own public assistance funds according to immigrant clas-
sifications. 164 This provision seems to contemplate the case that had been
joined to Richardson, where an alien successfully challenged Penn-
sylvania's restrictions on public assistance funded solely by that state. 65
Furthermore, section 553 establishes that the state's exercise of authority
may not exceed the restrictions that the federal government places upon
comparable public assistance programs. 66 This provision of IIRIRA
161. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
162. These divergent holdings in jurisprudence of immigration and public benefits
reflects the state of racial classifications in 1990, when the Court had thought that the
federal government had more freedom than the states to make race-based classifications.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The Court later changed this
opinion. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Justice O'Connor an-
nounced the concepts of skepticism, consistency and congruence. Of these, "congruence"
stands for the proposition that the Court shall use the same standard when reviewing clas-
sifications it deems suspect, whether the classification is used by the state or federal gov-
ernment. Id. at 224 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
163. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
164. Section 553 as codified is entitled, "Authority of states and political subdivi-
sions of states to limit assistance to aliens and to distinguish among classes of aliens in
providing general cash public assistance." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1624 (West Supp. 1997). The full
.text of section 553(a) as codified reads as follows:
Subject to subsection (b) of this section and notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a State or political subdivision of a State is authorized to prohibit or
otherwise limit or restrict the eligibility of aliens or classes of aliens for pro-
grams of general cash public assistance furnished under the law of the State or
political subdivision of a State.
Id.
165. Sailor v. Leger, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
166. The full text of section 553(b) as codified reads,as follows:
The authority provided for under subsection (a) of this section may be exercised
only to the extent that any prohibitions, limitations, or restrictions imposed by a
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seems to contemplate the third DeCanas test. The third DeCanas test
permits a state to apply immigration classifications to prohibit the em-
ployment of illegal aliens so long as the classifications do not act as an
obstacle to Congressional objectives. 167 Section 553 of IIRIRA is valid
only if DeCanas is controlling authority. However, §553 incorrectly as-
sumes that DeCanas is controlling authority. The rule of DeCanas con-
templates illegal immigration in the employment context. This context is
distinct from the context of section 553, which deals with state authority
over public benefits to legal immigrants.
Section 553 of IIRIRA is the unfortunate offspring of the union of
the two theories. The House report that accompanies the legislation states
that "it is the sense of Congress that a court should apply the same stan-
dard of review to an applicable State law as that court uses in determin-
ing whether an Act of Congress regulating the eligibility of aliens for
public benefits meets constitutional scrutiny."'' 61 In other words, the
House report indicates that the level of review used in Diaz, where a fed-
eral regulation of public benefits was considered, is applicable to the
governments of the individual states. In Diaz, the Court ruled that any
federal restriction was permissible so long as it was "not wholly irra-
tional."' 69 This standard of review is consistent with the view that the
immigration power is inherent in sovereignty, where the federal sover-
eign is empowered to determine who is admitted into the political
community.
As seen in the House Committee Report accompanying the law,
Congress intends to allow states to restrict public benefits under the leni-
State or political subdivision of a State are not more restrictive than the prohibi-
tions, limitations, or restrictions imposed under comparable Federal programs.
For purposes of this section, attribution to an alien of a sponsor's income and
resources (as described in section 1631 of this title) for purposes of determining
eligibility for, and the amount of, benefits shall be considered less restrictive
than a prohibition of eligibility for such benefits.
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ent "not wholly irrational" standard. In other words, Congress intends to
delegate to the states the panoply of federal authority, which allegedly
empowers the states to determine the requirements for public benefits us-
ing immigration classifications. This delegation of the immigration power
is tantamount to transferring the federal sovereign power to the states.
Therefore, Congress has attempted in section 553 to delegate a power
that it also treats as inherent in sovereignty. This attempted delegation of
the immigration power is logically impossible, for it asks us to treat the
immigration power as simultaneously delegatable and inherent. In conclu-
sion, section 553 of IIRIRA is impermissible because it is relies upon
blending two mutually exclusive theories.
